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Abstract—Over the past decade, focus on the security and
privacy aspects of implantable medical devices (IMDs) has in-
tensified, driven by the multitude of cybersecurity vulnerabilities
found in various existing devices. However, due to their strict
computational, energy and physical constraints, conventional
security protocols are not directly applicable to IMDs. Custom-
tailored schemes have been proposed instead which, however,
fail to cover the full spectrum of security features that modern
IMDs and their ecosystems so critically require. In this paper we
propose IMDfence, a security protocol for IMD ecosystems that
provides a comprehensive yet practical security portfolio, which
includes availability, non-repudiation, access control, emergency
access, entity authentication, remote monitoring and system
scalability. The performance of the security protocol as well as its
feasibility and impact on modern IMDs are extensively analyzed
and evaluated. We find that IMDfence achieves the above security
requirements at a mere 4.64% increase in total IMD energy
consumption, and less than 14 ms and 6 kB increase in system
delay and memory footprint respectively.
Index Terms—Authentication protocol, battery-depletion at-
tack, battery DoS, denial-of-service attack, IMD, implantable
medical device, non-repudiation, smart card, zero-power defense
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern implantable medical devices (IMDs), such as
cardiac pacemakers and defibrillators, neurostimulators, and
more, are equipped with wireless connectivity in order to aid
in treatment-related reconfiguration, patient-health monitoring,
device testing etc. [1], [2]. However, wireless links have made
IMDs susceptible to various attacks by malicious entities.
Earlier-generation IMDs had little or no security provisions
whatsoever, as confirmed by numerous ethical-hacking inci-
dents over the past decade [3]–[5]. The research community
has responded with a wealth of new schemes and, eventually,
top IMD manufacturers now claim to have rectified the secu-
rity weaknesses over the past few years [6], [7].
However, due to the constraints imposed by an IMD’s scant
computational, storage and energy resources, most proposed
schemes in research have refrained from taking proven security
approaches. Moreover, since these schemes have been specif-
ically tailored for IMDs, they have missed the big picture and
resulted in limited coverage of the security properties essential
to a modern IMD. Specifically, most focus has been drawn on
confidentiality, integrity, authentication and emergency access
(e.g., [8]–[11] etc.), while availability, non-repudiation, access
control and system scalability have been left unaddressed for
the most part. In addition to the fact that these additional
requirements are difficult to tackle, prior seminal work has
not identified or stressed their importance.
In this paper, we debunk the myth that advanced security
is impossible in modern IMDs. To this end, we collect both
typical and overlooked security requirements and propose
IMDfence, a novel, complete security protocol for an IMD
ecosystem. We make the following contributions:
• We provide a comprehensive security protocol for IMD
ecosystems, IMDfence, which addresses crucial, yet
previously ignored requirements, i.e., availability, non-
repudiation, access control, remote monitoring and sys-
tem scalability.
• We propose a complete and realistic solution for access-
ing the IMD during emergencies without compromising
security or patient safety.
• We provide an extensive evaluation of IMDfence, and pay
special attention to the protection against battery denial-
of-service (DoS) attacks.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We enumerate
IMD-system requirements in Section II, and then identify
related works in Section III. Section IV details our proposed
security protocol. We evaluate IMDfence in Section V and
provide concluding remarks in Section VI.
II. IMD-SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we collect and present the necessary security
and related functional requirements that should be satisfied
in modern IMD systems. These requirements form the basis
of the IMD-specific security protocol, to be detailed in Sec-
tion IV.
We consider an implant that is capable of communicating
wirelessly with a reader/programmer1. In order to evaluate
the IMD-system security, we assume an attacker whose aim
could be to either (1) modify or sabotage IMD operation
in order to prevent patient treatment, (2) manipulate patient-
related data, or (3) steal patient data. Furthermore, we assume
1The term reader will be used for any device that is able to directly
communicate with the implant.
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that the attacker has full control of the wireless channel
between the reader and IMD. This means that he/she can
eavesdrop, modify, insert, block or replay messages between
these two entities at will. As a result, the IMD-security system
is required to provide certain security services and domain-
specific requirements:
A. Basic security services (SR1)
Like in other domains, the IMD-security system should
provide the fundamental security services: Confidentiality,
Integrity and (message) Authentication, which are usually
addressed through the use of lightweight block-ciphers and
message-authentication codes (MAC) [12]. More specifically,
the commands sent from the reader to the IMD and the
associated responses (e.g., data logs) should be treated as
confidential and it should be ensured that such data is not
modified in transit.
B. Availability (SR2)
The IMD should always be available for patient treatment
whenever required. This implies that the device should be
protected against Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks. One of
the highest-likelihood and lowest-cost attacks is the battery-
depletion attack (or battery DoS attack), as indicated in the
IMD-specific threat-modeling analysis in [1] and practically
demonstrated in [3], [4].
C. Non-repudiation (SR3)
Since there is always a possibility of malpractices, medical
mistakes or insider attacks, we require non-repudiation to aid
in computer forensics in case a patient experiences medical
issues as a direct consequence of such actions. This security
service ensures that a physician, paramedic or nurse is not
able to repudiate his/her involvement in such scenarios. Non-
repudiation has not been given detailed consideration by the
research community when it comes to IMD systems. One of
the reasons is that true non-repudiation can only be achieved
through the use of public-key (or asymmetric) cryptography
for computing digital signatures, which has traditionally been
considered to be resource-costly for IMDs [12], [13]. Another,
very important, reason is that past generations of IMDs could
only be accessed by one person, i.e., the physician. Nowadays,
the IMDs can be accessed by multiple people, including
the patients themselves [14]–[16]. Hence, there is a need to
introduce user accountability.
Most of the existing IMD-security works have looked into
strict reader-IMD communication (without the involvement of
a trusted third party). Even if we assume that the resource-
constrained IMD is able to support public-key computations,
this (reader-IMD) configuration makes it impossible for the
IMD to effectively use public-key cryptography since it cannot
keep track of the validity of the reader certificates (due to lack
of Internet connectivity). What is more, these devices do not
have sufficient memory to store the required certificates [17].
For instance, the IMD must store all possible reader certificates
if we want to support access during travels or when the
patient is in a foreign location. Hence, a scheme is required
that employs the use of additional components (as will be
discussed in Section IV) to solve these issues.
Another complication is the legal aspect. Since non-
repudiation is there to provide evidence, it should be incor-
porated based on the assumption that such evidence will be
scrutinized by a hostile legal expert [18]. One main limitation
of cryptography-based non-repudiation is that there is no
formally-verifiable link between the device that signs the
digital signature and its user. For example, the user, i.e.,
the private-key owner, can falsely claim that the signature
has been generated by a malware program without his/her
consent, or that the private key has been stolen. There is
no technical mechanism that can determine whether such a
claim is false [19]. In this work, we propose to address this
limitation, which we term as the Non-repudiation gap, at the
policy level, i.e., as part of standard operating procedure.
D. Emergency Access (SR4)
Patient safety always outweighs device security. Hence, in
emergencies the security protocol should not hinder or delay
paramedic access to the IMD [2], [20]. Although it seems
reasonable to drop security altogether in such situations, this
can be a problem if, in a normal scenario, an adversary
fools the IMD into entering the emergency-access mode. The
security protocol must be capable of allowing the IMD to
accurately classify whether a communication attempt is an
emergency access or normal access. This ensures that the
adversary is unable to trigger and exploit the emergency-
access mode. Furthermore, since there is a high likelihood
of the patient losing control of his/her actions in emergencies,
the emergency-access mode should be independent of patient
participation.
E. Multi-manufacturer environment (SR5)
In emergencies, it is unlikely for the paramedic to know the
IMD model and manufacturer name beforehand. Moreover, it
is not possible to preemptively stock all the readers from all
the manufacturers in the ambulance. Hence, the IMD-security
system should be vendor-independent, i.e., all the vendors
need to agree on a unified standard for secure reader-IMD
communication. This way an ambulance can use one generic
reader regardless of the IMD vendor and type. It follows that
an emergency-access scheme should be adoptable by all IMD
types. E.g., an emergency-access solution that requires an IMD
measuring the cardiac signal, can be easily incorporated in
pacemakers, but it will require significant modifications in
neurostimulators.
F. Access control (SR6)
The access privileges of the reader user should be dif-
ferentiated based on the type of user. For example, nurses,
patients or patient relatives may only be allowed to read status
data from the implant, whereas a physician and a paramedic
may also be allowed to modify the implant configuration for
therapy updates or suspend or resume its operation. Similarly,
a technician may be allowed to modify the implant firmware
in addition to tasks of the above roles.
G. User and reader-IMD Authentication (SR7)
In order to aid in non-repudiation and access control, the
IMD system should be able to identify the physician, nurse,
paramedic etc. who is using the reader to communicate with
the implant. Conversely, the reader should also be able to
authenticate the IMD in order to prevent spoofing attacks
on the reader. Hence, there is a requirement of performing
mutual authentication instead of just authenticating the reader
unilaterally [12]. Furthermore, said authentication is required
to be strong, i.e., it should imply both message and entity
authentication, and guarantee message freshness, or in other
words replay protection.
H. Flexibility and Scalability (SR8)
The IMD should not be limited to communicating with only
a fixed amount of readers since this severely limits portability,
e.g., during emergencies when a paramedic reader is used, or
when there is a need for treatment at some hospital during
travels. Hence, there should not be any pre-shared secrets
between the reader and IMD.
I. Bedside-reader operation for remote monitoring (SR9)
Some of the modern IMD systems also include a bedside
reader, which enables remote monitoring [21]. It establishes
communication with the IMD when the patient is asleep and
sends treatment status to a back-end server via an Internet
connection. However, this additional connection represents an
increase in the attack surface, which imposes additional secu-
rity requirements. We predict that the use of such readers will
become more widespread over time due to their time- and cost-
saving features. Hence, this phenomenon should proactively be
considered when designing secure IMD systems.
III. EXISTING SYSTEMS AND RELATED WORK
IMD manufacturers have typically relied on “security
through obscurity”, in which they choose to hide the
communication-protocol specifications in order to enhance
security. This is not a recommended practice, and as a conse-
quence of using this approach, we have seen several successful
blackbox-hacking attempts over the past few years [3], [4].
Most commercial IMDs communicate with the physician’s
programmer through an Inductive Coupling channel. In ad-
dition, some of the latest devices, including neurostimula-
tors [16], insertable cardiac monitors [15] and even pace-
makers [14] offer a Bluetooth Smart connection between the
patient smart-phone and the implant. The initial pairing be-
tween these devices is based on the Bluetooth Smart standard
in addition to proprietary protocols [16]. However, they do
not disclose the association models used in these pairings,
which makes these devices vulnerable to attacks due to the
reasons mentioned above. In most of the cardiac devices,
in the absence of an IMD-programmer, a magnet can be
used to disable therapy or to switch to a non-programmed
behavior [22]. This mode, however, can be easily exploited
by adversaries through the use of a strong magnet when in
close proximity to the patient (e.g., in public transport).
From the perspective of the research community, we observe
a steep rise in the number of works proposed over the last
few years [23]. For data confidentiality, integrity and message
authentication, the use of lightweight primitives has been
proposed. Early works focused on basic security protocols
based on symmetric ciphers, which rely on a common pre-
shared key between the reader and the IMD [12]. However,
such approaches are not scalable in terms of adding new
readers that can access the implant. They also do not allow
paramedic access during emergencies. Therefore, most of the
existing works pertain to the domain-specific requirement of
emergency access, in addition to entity authentication and key
exchange. For entity authentication, these works rely on the
touch-to-access policy, which ensures that only the entities that
can physically touch the patient for a prolonged period of time
are allowed access to the implant [1], [20]. In other words, it
is infeasible for an attacker to get in close proximity to the
patient, and even if that is the case, the patient would detect
this and reject physical contact. Also, the attacker would then
have far easier methods to harm the patient than via accessing
the implant, e.g., by physically attacking the patient. These
works can be broadly categorized as follows [2]:
a) Biometric-based: These approaches (such as [20],
[24]) rely on both the reader and IMD to measure a phys-
iological signal from different parts of the patient’s body.
The devices are paired based on the similarity of these
measurements.
b) Proxy-based: These works propose to use an addi-
tional device in the possession of the patient, such as a smart
phone, watch, etc [25], [26]. The device is paired with the
IMD and is used to authenticate the reader that is trying
to communicate with the implant. In case of emergency, the
device can be physically distanced from the patient in order
to grant the reader unsecured access to the IMD.
c) Distance-based: These works (e.g., [27], [28]) employ
weak or out-of-band (OOB) signals for reader-IMD commu-
nication. These can either involve direct transfer of a session
key, which would be hard for an attacker to eavesdrop, or
they can require the devices to mutually prove proximity to
one another.
d) Token-based: This is the simplest approach, which
relies on the patients having the IMD-access key or password
with them, which is stored e.g., on a bracelet. During an
emergency, a paramedic can access the IMD using this token.
We now present a brief overview of the latest works from
literature that were specifically tailored for IMDs.
Bu et al. propose a low-energy IMD-security scheme called
Bulwark [8], which, in addition to providing basic security
services (SR1), also allows IMD access in emergencies (SR4).
This emergency access scheme is based on Shamir’s secret
sharing, which relies on the users (including the paramedics)
to register with the manufacturer of the specific IMD in
advance in order to retrieve the access key in case of an
emergency. As evident, such a requirement inhibits IMD
access in case the patient is out of town (SR8).
Chi et al. [10] propose a protocol that relies on the patient’s
smartphone for the reader access. However, requiring the
patient to be in possession of this additional device (i.e., the
smartphone) all the time, including during emergencies, puts
a significant burden on the patient.
Belkhouja et al. [11] propose a symmetric crypto system in
which they use a Chaotic key generator that is employed by
both the reader and IMD to generate the symmetric key. How-
ever, in order for this key generator to work, both entities are
required to have similar pre-installed initial conditions/values.
Hence, this scheme cannot function in an emergency scenario,
or when the patient is traveling, since the IMD and the reader
will not be sharing the same initial conditions.
Wazid et al. [29] and Mao et al. [30] propose three-
factor protocols, which rely on passwords, smart cards, and
biometrics. However, their protocols rely on an offline-user-
registration phase before an actual session can take place,
which inhibits SR4 and SR8. Rathore et al. [31] propose a
scheme in which the identifiers of each user (including the
patient) are derived from their cardiac signals and are stored
in the implant. Hence, it requires a user-registration phase
similar to the above protocols. However, their scheme allows
emergency access since the paramedic can measure patient’s
cardiac signal, which is compared by the IMD against the
stored identifier in order to grant access. The three-factor
protocol from Fu et al. [32] also provides emergency access.
However, the patient is required to always be in possession of
a personal smart card so that the paramedic is able to use it
during an emergency.
In addition, quite a few authentication and emergency-
access schemes have been proposed recently that rely on static
biometrics (such as fingerprints) [33], dynamic biometrics
(such as cardiac signals) [34] and combination of both [9].
The interested reader can refer to [23], [35]–[38] to get an
overview of prior works in this area.
Overall, the above works address only parts of the IMD
security requirements (SR1, SR2, SR4 and SR7). For in-
stance, non-repudiation is not considered and the emergency-
access schemes do not take into account the (current) multi-
manufacturer environment, as discussed in Section II. To the
best of our knowledge, there is no protocol that provides all
the services highlighted in Section II.
The work from literature that came closest to fulfilling the
above requirements was proposed by Park [39]. It establishes
a session key between the IMD and a personalized reader
based on shared secrets between these entities and a trusted
third party (hospital server). The use of public-key crypto in
the personalized reader and the server enables non-repudiation.
However, the issue of non-repudiation gap is not addressed.
The protocol addresses access control by first allowing only
read access to the implant via the server. Based on the result
of the read-out data, the server provides write keys to the
reader-IMD pair which allows the user to change IMD settings.
The personalization process involves the physician inserting a
TABLE I
TABLE OF NOTATIONS
Notation Definition
IDA ID of entity A
NA Nonce generated by A
KpubA/KprA Public/private key pair of A
KAB Pre-shared symmetric key between A and B
K′AB Short-term symmetric key between A and B
KA A secret only known to A
PA Privilege information of user/card A
CMD Configuration command
ANS Answer to CMD
k Difficulty of solving a client puzzle
x < i > ith bit of a bitstring x
x < i : j > Bit sequence x < i >, ..., x < j >
t Time stamp
T Lifetime of reader-card authentication
NAC Number of allowed user-authentication cycles
{}KAB Authenticated encryption*using KAB
MACKAB () MAC operation using key KAB
sigKprA() Signature (of a hashed message) using KprA
CertA Certificate consisting of IDA, PA, KpubA and
sigKprCA(IDA, PA,KpubA)
* Such as Encrypt-then-MAC (EtM). Separate keys should be used for
the encryption and MAC operations to prevent certain attacks and to
ease key management [19]. However, these keys are not differentiated
here for simplicity.
personal smart card into the reader. However, the details of
this interaction, i.e. the exchange of messages between the
reader and the smart card are not provided. Moreover, since
it resembles a single-factor authentication for the user (i.e.,
through the use of smart card without PIN), any person in
possession of a valid (stolen) card can access the implant
by getting hold of the reader. The server maintains a list of
primary-care physicians authorized to access each registered
implant. If the physician is a member of this list, then a read-
key is granted to the physician. We feel that maintaining such
a user list is not scalable, it inhibits flexibility, and hence,
should not be employed. Besides, the proposed emergency-
access scheme uses a bracelet that has a secret key. However,
such token-based security schemes are single points of failure
(e.g., in case the token is stolen or the contents are disclosed).
Also, it requires the patient to wear the bracelet at all times,
which is impractical. Moreover, in the emergency scenario, the
scheme drops access control and non-repudiation. Lastly, this
work excludes battery DoS from its adversarial model, and
does not consider bedside-reader operation.
IV. IMDFENCE: SECURITY PROTOCOL FOR IMD
ECOSYSTEMS
The absence of a complete security solution for IMD
systems has led us to propose IMDfence, a novel secure-
communication protocol that satisfies the requirements enu-
merated in Section II. As will be seen, IMDfence necessarily
addresses the complete IMD ecosystem.
Wireless
Reader (R)
IMD (I)
(registered with S)
Programmer
Bedside reader
Smart card (C)
(registered with S)
Hospital server (S)
Fig. 1. Proposed IMD ecosystem
A. Configuration and assumptions
The IMDfence configuration includes a smart card (C) for
the user (U ) trying to access the IMD (e.g., a physician), and a
trusted third party (TTP), i.e., a hospital server (S), in addition
to the implant (I) and the reader (R); see Fig. 1. The list of
notations used in this paper is summarized in Table I. The
extra components, C and S, are employed to facilitate non-
repudiation (SR3), access control (SR6) and user authenti-
cation (SR7), as identified in Section II. Each personal smart
card, which is inserted in R, supports public-key cryptography.
Its private key, which is unique to each card/user, enables
digital-signature computation, thus providing non-repudiation.
Since R and C are untrusted with respect to each other, a TTP
(S) is required to mutually authenticate the two entities. Non-
repudiation can technically also be provided through the use
of a personal reader that supports public-key computations in
order to get rid of C and S. However, such a solution would
be highly impractical and expensive since it would require all
the doctors and nurses to be in possession of their personal
readers at all times. Moreover, the use of S also enables access
control and facilitates bedside-reader operation (SR9). Every
user requires their own C and should know the associated PIN
(two-factor authentication). To avoid additional attack vectors,
we propose to not support the use of contactless smart cards
and magnetic-strip cards.
1) Interfaces: For tackling flexibility and scalability (SR8),
there is no pre-shared key between R ↔ I , R ↔ C, S ↔ R,
and C ↔ I . The only pre-shared symmetric keys that exist
are between S ↔ I (KSI ) and S ↔ C (KSC). A unique
KSI is installed in the implant at the time of manufacturing,
which is then shared with the server of the hospital where
the implantation surgery is going to take place. During this
IMD-registration process, the implant is also assigned a unique
and random identifier IDI , which is stored in the implant.
Likewise, KSC is installed in the smart card and is shared
with the hospital where the card user is registered. Moreover,
S, I and C can only talk to R directly and only indirectly
with each other2.
The secure communication between S ↔ R is made pos-
sible by employing public-key-based key exchange in which
the public/private key pairs of these entities are used. This
2The routing details of the messages communicated via the reader have
been omitted for brevity.
configuration helps in making R independent of the need to
pre-share keys with the hospital, which aids in scalability.
As a result, a patient can use his/her personal reader from
any location, and/or buy a new reader from the manufacturer
without the need of registering it first at the hospital.
In our proposed configuration, each smart card also has its
own public/private key pair. Technically, R has the capability
to maintain a comprehensive certificate-revocation list (CRL)
of smart cards due to frequent Internet connectivity. Hence,
it is able to verify smart cart certificates. On the other hand,
due to the limited on-board memory and less-frequent Internet
connectivity, C can only maintain a small CRL that does not
change frequently. Hence, C can not verify the authenticity
of the multitude of reader certificates. As a result, public-key-
based key exchange cannot be used to establish a session key
between R ↔ C. However, it will be shown in Section IV-C
that the session key between R↔ C will be established using
S as a TTP. The same will be done for establishing session key
between R ↔ I . Lastly, no session key is required between
C ↔ I .
2) Centralization and Public-key infrastructure: The public
keys of S, R and C are signed by a trusted certification
authority (CA). The smart-card certificates, in addition, also
include the user privileges.
We consider the precise implementation details of public-
key infrastructure (PKI) and certificate revocation outside the
scope of this paper. In case of a smart card, certificate revo-
cation would be needed when a card is stolen, a user leaves,
or if he/she changes roles (e.g., from nurse to paramedic). For
a reader, certificate revocation would be required in case R
is stolen or deemed as out-of-service. The server is given the
responsibility to verify the certificates of R and C and hence,
it is assumed that it maintains an up-to-date CRL.
3) Modes of operation: We propose two modes of operating
in IMDfence, one for regular (online) operation and the other
in the absence of an active Internet connection (offline), e.g.,
during emergencies (SR4); see Fig. 2. Online mode offers the
full security- and functional-requirement portfolio highlighted
in Section II, whereas offline mode results in the graceful
degradation of offered services without compromising security
and patient safety. Since S is not available in offline mode,
R and I will be required to undergo an out-of-band (OOB)
pairing phase in order to securely exchange a short-term
session key. These modes and the constituent phases will be
elaborated in the coming sections.
B. Threat model
As discussed in Section II, we assume an attacker A that
has full control of the wireless channel between the reader
and IMD. R is assumed to be untrustworthy by I , C and
S, and vice versa. Moreover, we assume that if A steals a
personal smart card or a valid reader, then the user or hospital
staff should notify the hospital server so that it is blacklisted.
Additionally, we assume that A can hack the reader to read
out or modify data at the interface of the inserted smart card.
However, A does not have access to the keys stored in R and
Online setting
Reader-card 
authentication
User 
authentication
Session-key 
establishment
Main phase
OOB session-
key transfer
Main phase 
(offline)
Offline access 
in the field
Fig. 2. IMDfence flow
C. This implies that protection against side-channel attacks is
considered outside the scope of this work since such attacks
are typically addressed through specialized countermeasures.
Nonetheless, it will be shown in Section V-A2 that such attacks
will not be of any use to the attacker if R and/or C are reported
as stolen. We also assume that the hospital personal do not
have access to the keys stored in the server since such attacks
can be prevented by employing standard practices, such as
using hardware security module (HSM) etc.
C. Regular (online) mode
The regular mode of IMDfence is shown in Figures 3 to 6.
It starts with the R↔ C mutual authentication phase after the
physician (or any other user) inserts his/her smart card into the
reader.
1) R ↔ C mutual authentication: In this phase, R first
tries to establish a secure connection with S by sending its
identifier and a nonce (which is a freshly generated number
that is used only once). In order to deter distributed-denial-of-
service (DDoS) attacks against S (to ensure server availability
(SR2)), a basic client-puzzle protocol (CPP) is employed [40].
CPP is a proof-of-work system in which any client (or in this
case a reader) that wants to access the server (during high
load) is required to correctly solve a cryptographic puzzle. For
a regular client the costs of solving this puzzle are negligible.
However, in order to launch a successful DDoS by initiating
a large number of simultaneous connections, it would be
computationally infeasible for the attacker to solve a multitude
of such puzzles.
S initiates CPP if it senses a DDoS attack or it is dealing
with an abnormally high number of simultaneous connections.
It first calculates x, which is the n-bit hash of IDR, the current
time stamp t and its long-term secret KS . It then computes
a second hash (h(x)). S sends h(x) and x excluding the first
k bits of x, along with the t. R computes the solution, i.e.,
the missing k bits of x, and sends it along with IDR and
the received time stamp. k represents the difficulty of solving
the puzzle. S calculates x again and verifies that the solution
indeed corresponds to the missing bits. It also verifies, with
the help of t, that the puzzle has not expired. S is protected
against memory exhaustion since it is not required to store any
data for the verification of the puzzle solution. In case these
checks are successful, S sends its nonce to R.
R then performs a Diffie–Hellman (DH)-based handshake
with S in which a session key is established between them
Reader R Back-end server S User smart card C
IDR, NR
x = h(IDR,KS , t),
puzzle = (h(x), x < k + 1 : n >)
puzzle, t
IDR, t, solution = x < 1 : k >
Calculate x,
Verify solution,
Check puzzle expiry
Client-puzzle protocol
NS
DH-based key (K ′SR) exchange. S checks
R validity
IDR, NR, NS
IDC , NC ,mSC1 = {CertC , IDR, NC,R,S}KSC
{mSC1}K′SR
VerifymSC1 , Check C validity,
Check source network and time of access,
tokenC = {IDR, NC , valid,K ′RC , NAC}KSC ,
tokenR = {IDC , NR, valid,K ′RC , T}K′SR
tokenC , tokenR
Verify tokenR
tokenC ,MACK′RC (NR, NC)
Verify MAC and tokenC ,
Set remaining aempts to
NAC
MACK′RC (NC , NR + 1)
Verify MAC,
Set token-expiry time to T
IMDFence
Fig. 3. Reader-card authentication. Steps that are common with bedside-reader
mode are marked as blue.
based on their public/private key pairs (see Fig. 3). During
this handshake, both verify each other’s certificates and, addi-
tionally, S checks if R is valid (i.e., it is not reported as stolen
or out-of-service).
In order to achieve authentication between R and C, R then
initiates a five-pass, mutual-authentication protocol borrowed
from the ISO/IEC 9798-2 standard [41] with S acting as a
TTP (see Fig. 3). R generates its nonce and sends it along
with its identifier and NS to C. C responds by generating NC
and sending a cryptogram (mSC1 ) that includes authenticated
encryption of its certificate, IDR and nonces, along with IDC
and NC in plaintext. This cryptogram is calculated using KSC
since it is intended for the server. R stores IDC and NC ,
and forwards the cryptogram to the server, which establishes
that it originated from C and that it is also tied to R. The
server then checks the validity of C, in case it has been
reported stolen or has expired. It then calculates tokens for
both these entities using the respective symmetric keys. These
tokens include the nonces and identifiers of R and C and a
Reader R User smart card C
MACK′RC (NR, NC + 2)
Verify MAC
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Verify MAC,
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Fig. 4. User authentication at the reader
fresh symmetric key K ′RC . Additionally, tokenR and tokenC
also contain T (reader-card-authentication lifetime) and NAC
(number of allowed user-authentication cycles), respectively.
Based on these tokens, R and C can be sure about each other’s
trustworthiness.
R decrypts tokenR, retrieves K ′RC , calculates the MAC of
the nonces, and forwards it along with tokenC to C. The smart
card similarly decrypts tokenC and verifies the received MAC
using K ′RC . C sends a MAC that is calculated over NR and
NC (including an addition by 1 to protect against replay of the
previous message). R verifies the received MAC using K ′RC .
At this point, both R and C have mutually authenticated each
other.
R then sets its internal real-time clock to T and starts it
to track the period over which the subsequent phases can
execute without the need of reader-card authentication. Since
it is possible that R is not connected to the Internet during its
operation (e.g., in emergencies), this scheme enforces that R,
by design, shall only be usable for a certain duration until it
has first established an Internet connection. This makes sure
that R receives critical firmware updates in time, if there are
any. This will be discussed further in Sections IV-D and V-A4.
2) User authentication: This phase is shown in Fig. 4 and
its objective is to authenticate the card holder. Both R and
C first recalculate and exchange the MACs of their nonces
(including an addition by 2 and 3, respectively, to protect
against replays) in order to verify that this phase is linked
to the tokens acquired in the previous phase. This MAC re-
exchange is introduced for the offline mode, to be discussed
in Section IV-D. R then checks its internal real-time clock to
verify the validity of its token.
Then, the physician enters his/her PIN using a keypad on
the reader. R encrypts the PIN and the nonces (in order to
prevent replays) using K ′RC . C decrypts the message using the
same key, verifies the PIN by comparing it with the stored one
and sends back a cryptogram intended for the server, which is
Reader R Back-end server S Implant I
À IDR, NR
Á IDI , NI
{IDR,I , NR,I , IDC , NC ,mSC2}K′SR
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Store IDC , NC , NR
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Kerberos style key exchange between A and B
Fig. 5. Session-key establishment between R and I via S. All the steps are
also performed in the bedside-reader mode.
encrypted with KSC . It contains the confirmation of success
in addition to the nonces.
A user can access the reader NAC times after which
tokenC is considered expired and the card is required to
perform a new reader-card authentication. A smart card can
keep track of the number of accesses by storing the count in
the flash memory of its MCU. It can be argued to have tokenC
expired after a certain time duration instead of keeping count
of the number of user-authentication cycles since it seemingly
violates message freshness. The stumbling block is the fact
that smart cards are not battery powered, and hence, they do
not have a continuously running clock that can keep track of
time. However, it will be shown in Section V-A2 that stealing
a reader with a valid token will not give A any advantage
because of the additional protection provided by the touch-to-
access principle.
3) Session-key (K ′RI ) establishment: R then initiates a
TTP-based key established protocol with S and I in order
to acquire a symmetric session key K ′RI for providing basic
services (SR1), as shown in Fig. 5. R first exchanges the
nonces and identifiers with I and then sends the nonces and
identifiers of all parties to S along with mSC2 . S first verifies
mSC2 , and then determines the required privileges (PC) for
the particular user (e.g., physician, paramedic, nurse etc) from
CertC . It generates K ′RI , encrypts it in two independent
messages mR and mI intended for R and I respectively,
and then sends these to R. R decrypts mR and verifies its
contents. It then encrypts NR and NI using K ′RI (to form
mRI ) and then sends it along with mI to I . I first retrieves
K ′RI by decrypting mI , and then decrypts mRI to verify that
R has the knowledge of K ′RI and that the nonces are valid.
I finally creates a MAC using the new session key for R to
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Fig. 6. Main phase. Steps that are common with bedside-reader mode are
marked as blue. Operations that are unique to bedside-reader mode are marked
as green.
validate. At the end of this protocol, both R and I are mutually
authenticated (SR7) and have arrived at a fresh session key
in addition to performing key confirmation. This session-key-
establishment phase is based on the Kerberos protocol, which
employs time-stamps and life-time values to ensure freshness.
These values are not employed in our case because of the
associated complexity, e.g., the need for clock synchronization
between R and I etc. [42]. To ensure message freshness, I
additionally sends NI to R in step 2, and then verifies the
existence of NI in the subsequent messages.
To protect against battery-DoS attacks (which impact avail-
ability (SR2)), steps 1 to 4 of the session-key establishment
should be as lightweight as possible so that the IMD is able
to execute it using harvested RF energy. This will be further
discussed in Section V-B.
4) Main phase: After the establishment of session key, R
allows the user to enter a command on the reader interface (see
Fig. 6). The command is encrypted along with the nonces (to
prevent replay attacks) using K ′RC and is sent to C. The card
decrypts the command, digitally signs the message using KprC
(to form sig) and sends it to R. R re-encrypts the command
using K ′RI and sends it to the implant along with sig.
I decrypts the command and verifies if it corresponds to
the privileges information received in mI during the previous
phase, hence ensuring access control. sig is stored by the IMD
next to IDC , NC and NR, which were stored during session-
key establishment. This is required to ensure non-repudiation
since sig was signed using a personal private key. For example,
in the case of a medical mistake (e.g., an incorrect command)
that led to patient death, the physician will not be able to
deny his/her involvement since this signature can always be
retrieved from the IMD and subsequently verified using the
associated data. Since the implant trusts the reader at this
point, there is no need for I to verify the signature since the
associated MAC has already been verified by R. This relieves
I of the need to employ public-key cryptography and to track
user certificates. After processing the command, the implant
responds with an answer message encrypted with K ′RI . R
displays it on its screen for the convenience of the user. The
session keys expire after a finish command and its associated
response, or after a period T .
5) Addressing the non-repudiation gap: As discussed in
Section II, the use of signature alone is not sufficient to address
the legal aspects of non-repudiation. In order to bridge the non-
repudiation gap, one option could be to enforce that the user
protects C and the associated PIN, or immediately reports in
case it is lost. However, due to the possibility of human error
in general, this is too much of a legal responsibility for the
user.
The realistic way of bridging this gap is by introduc-
ing additional checks in the implementation of reader-card-
authentication and session-key-establishment phases (see Fig-
ures 3 and 5). The server can ensure that the implant write ac-
cess is requested from within the hospital network and during
the working hours of the user. On the other hand, the server can
allow read-only accesses from external networks, e.g., in case
the access is made by a patient’s bedside reader. The user just
has to ensure that R is issued from a certified repository, and
that R should only be connected to a trusted Ethernet network
(i.e., in a hospital or patient home). With these precautions,
which a responsible user can easily follow, protection can be
ensured against the malicious replacement of a command by a
compromised reader, or against an attacker sending a malicious
command him/herself in order to frame the said user. Due to
the above risk-based multi-factor authentication, a user cannot
falsely deny his/her involvement in a certain implant access
because the alternative explanation implies that (1) the attacker
stole a valid reader, card and pin, (2) accessed the implant from
within the hospital and during the user’s working hours, and
(3) R and C were not reported as stolen. The likelihood of
all of this happening at once is extremely small, or, in other
words, the non-repudiation gap is effectively bridged by the
introduction of above checks.
6) Bedside-reader operation: The online mode also fa-
cilitates bedside-reader operation (see Fig. 1). Here, only
the DH-based handshake between bedside R and S (from
reader-card authentication phase), the session-key establish-
ment phase, and the main phase (with a few differences,
as indicated in Fig. 6 and Fig. 5, respectively) need to be
executed, since the commands and responses are only sent
and read by S. Moreover, since the remote monitoring done
in practice is only read only, i.e., with the lowest access
privileges, there is no need for non-repudiation if the read-
only access control is implemented correctly. This can be
done if sig in step 6 is replaced by MAC of CMD from S
(i.e., MACKSI (CMD,NR, NI)). Using this MAC, I is able
to verify that the command came from the server, and hence, it
can be executed with read-only privileges. Finally, the hospital
staff can retrieve the critical treatment data by logging into S.
It can be argued that this remote-access mode should support
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Fig. 7. Scenario when the patient is out of town
read/write access instead of just read-only in order to enable
remote firmware updates. However, we stress that such updates
should always occur in the presence of a qualified professional.
This is important in case patient health suddenly deteriorates
due to the update process. Moreover, in practice it is quite
common and acceptable to get the IMD firmwares updated at
the clinic in the presence of a physician [7]. This mode is also
useful for securely retrieving the stored signatures pertaining
to previous programming sessions in order to free up limited
IMD memory.
7) IMD access from a non-local location: In Sec-
tion IV-A1, we discussed that the smart card and the implant
are registered at the local hospital, or in other words, they
share their respective symmetric keys with the hospital server.
During travels or when the patient is out of town, a situation
may arise that requires access to the IMD for status monitoring
or treatment updates at a non-local hospital. In this situation,
the above scheme (see Fig. 1) will not work straightaway
since the IMD is not registered at this hospital. Hence minor
extensions are required (see Fig. 7), in which the non-local
(remote) server SR establishes a secure connection with the
local hospital SL via an IMD-vendor server SV . SV maintains
a list of all the IMDs in service and the hospitals at which they
are registered. Based on IDI sent by R to SR (and then SR to
SV ) during the session-key establishment phase (see Fig. 5),
SV determines SL and establishes a secure connection with
it. SR sends K ′RI , the relevant identifiers, nonces and PC to
SL (via SV ) so that SL is able to construct mI and send it
back to SR. The protocol then proceeds normally and the IMD
eventually retrieves K ′RI after decrypting mI .
D. Offline mode
In the absence of an active Internet connection and hence,
the TTP (S), e.g., during emergencies, R and I need to
establish a temporary shared key so that they can communicate
directly in a secure manner. We propose to employ an OOB-
channel-based key exchange while using the principle of
touch-to-access (as discussed in Section III). This principle is
employed by I to establish trust with R since we assume R to
be untrustworthy from the perspective of the IMD. We propose
to use galvanic coupling for the OOB channel (between R
and I) since it results in virtually zero electromagnetic leak-
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Fig. 8. IMDfence (Offline mode)
age compared to other coupling methods, such as capacitive
coupling [43]. Moreover, it has advantage over biometric-
based touch-to-access mechanisms (mentioned in Section III)
because it does not require any initial RF communication
messages before the IMD is sure that the external entity is
in close proximity. This provides an additional security layer,
which is critical for the pre-deployment configuration that will
be discussed Section IV-D1.
The paramedic places the galvanic-coupling interface of
the reader on the patient skin3 at a point that is nearest to
the IMD. The patient is assumed to thwart advances of a
stranger trying to place a reader on his/her skin, if there is
no emergency or a need for treatment. Hence, the implant
assumes that the message received from the OOB interface is
from a trustworthy source. In other words, in offline mode,
the IMD-system security hinges on this OOB pairing.
The protocol is shown in Fig. 8. The paramedic is required
to perform reader-card authentication when starting his/her
duty, so that both R and C obtain their respective tokens
3Touching the skin is mandatory for the galvanic channel to function.
from S. When IMD access is required in an offline setting,
R first initiates user authentication with the paramedic smart
card in the same way as in the regular mode. Similar to the
online mode, R verifies that its internal real-time-clock value
is less than T . Moreover, the paramedic is allowed NAC
authentication cycles (or attempts) before the card requires
a new token. Through the OOB channel, R sends a request
for offline access along with its identifier. Upon receiving this
request, the implant assumes that this is an offline scenario
since this channel is activated only in such extraordinary
circumstances. As a result, it generates a random key K ′RI
and its nonce and sends them along with IDI to the reader
using the same channel.
R, then, initiates session-key confirmation with I in which
both entities verify each other’s MACs that are generated
using K ′RI . In order to update or inquire about the implant
operation, the paramedic enters the command on the reader
interface, which is encrypted using K ′RC and is sent to C.
The card digitally signs this command and sends it back to
R. R encrypts the command using K ′RI , calculates its MAC
and sends it to I along with sigKprC(CMD,NR, NC). This
signature is stored by the IMD and is required to ensure non-
repudiation, as discussed in Section IV-C. The IMD responds
with an answer encrypted by the same session key, which is
subsequently displayed on the reader display. The session key
expires in a manner similar to that in the regular mode.
In offline mode, the user is allowed paramedic-level privi-
leges, which has less access rights compared to a technician
(see Section II). The use of the OOB channel in the beginning
of the protocol makes it straightforward for the implant to
conclude on granting only paramedic-role commands.
1) Offline access with/without non-repudiation and access
control: We also propose a second flavor of the offline mode
in which non-repudiation and user authentication are not a
requirement. This is suitable for less critical implants, such as
neurostimulators. This flavor does not require a smart card,
and as a result we do not require the reader-card- and user-
authentication phases in addition to signature generation. From
the perspective of usability, this helps in removing some of
the responsibilities from the paramedic. In this scheme, the
touch-to-access principle is deemed to be sufficient in order
to ensure trust establishment. It is important to note that for
IMDfence, supporting non-repudiation during offline mode
must be decided before the IMD-system deployment, so as
to avoid exploitation.
2) Offline access with/without reader-interface standardiza-
tion: As indicated in Section II, supporting emergency access
in the field requires a standardized reader interface, which
demands collaboration between major IMD manufacturers.
In order to facilitate this multi-manufacturer environment
(SR5), there has to be one agreed-upon root CA that grants
certificates to the vendors, who can then act as intermediate
CAs that sign public keys of S, R and C. As things stand,
however, real emergency access does not exist in commercial
IMDs. As long as this remains an open issue, the above
standardization is not required, and as a result, IMDfence can
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Fig. 9. IMDfence configurations and use cases
be simplified by eliminating the need for a global root CA.
Emergency-access support in IMDfence is intended to be there
in anticipation of any future changes in this regard.
E. Summary of protocol configurations
The different configurations of IMDfence are highlighted
in Fig. 9. The dotted boxes indicate (fixed) pre-deployment
configurations, which cannot be changed at run-time. Such
configurations were discussed in Sections IV-D1 and IV-D2.
IMDfence is designed in such a way that an attacker cannot
target one mode over another for exploitation. For instance, the
offline mode is only triggered after an OOB access, which is
protected by the touch-to-access principle. Moreover, the sub-
modes of online access only come about by disabling certain
IMDfence steps instead of switching to a totally independent
behavior.
V. EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate our system in terms of security
feasibility and also look into the handling of battery-DoS
protection for IMDs.
A. Security analysis
1) Automatic validation using AVISPA tool: For the auto-
mated and formal validation of IMDfence, we used AVISPA
(Automated Validation of Internet Security Protocols and
Applications) [44]. Any protocol to be validated using this
tool is specified using the High-Level Protocol Specification
Language (HLPSL). An HLPSL specification consists of a
description of the principals (i.e., R, I , C, S and the user
in our case), security goals of the protocol, and the details of
the session(s) to be analyzed. AVISPA integrates four back-
end engines that provide different types of automatic analysis
of an HLPSL specification [44]. The tool helps in detecting
vulnerabilities against Man-in-the-middle and replay attacks.
It also detects if the HLPSL specification is executable, i.e.,
all the specified protocol states are traversable. Using AVISPA,
we can also optimize our protocols by removing certain pa-
rameters from the messages in order to reduce communication
overhead and analyze if this results in a new vulnerability.
The analysis of IMDfence using AVISPA is summarized in
Table II. The protocol handshake-specific requirements (SR1,
SR3, SR6 and SR7) are satisfied by specifying the appropriate
goals. In phase III, S extracts user privileges from CertC after
TABLE II
SUMMARY OF AVISPA ANALYSIS
Phase AVISPA goal* Coverage
I. Reader-card auth. Secrecy of K′RC SR1, SR7
C → R | NC
R→ C | NR
S → C | NS
II. User auth. Secrecy of PIN SR1, SR7
C → U | PIN
III. Session-key est. Secrecy of K′RI SR1, SR6,
S → C | NS SR7
I → R | NI
R→ I | NR
I → S | NI
IV. Main Phase Secrecy of CMD,ANS SR1, SR3
S → C | NS
* A→ B | N : A authenticates B based on value N
Secrecy of N : Confidentiality of value N is ensured
successful authentication of C based on NS in mSC2 . I then
verifies S based on NI to complete the chain from the card
to the implant in order to ensure access control. In order to
ensure non-repudiation, the server retrieves sig from the IMD
via the bedside reader, and verifies that it originated from C
during the session corresponding to NS .
2) Attack scenarios: When considering all possible attack
scenarios, we define the following reader types:
1) Valid R (Rvalid): This is a legitimate device, which is
not reported as stolen.
2) Stolen R (Rstolen): A legitimate device which is re-
ported as stolen.
3) Hacked R (Rhacked): A stolen reader which is also
modified by A in order to e.g., replace the signature
or CMD.
4) Forged R (Rforged): A custom-built or software-defined
radio used by A in order to communicate with an
implant. This reader does not have any pre-shared keys
with S.
The following scenarios are possible in terms of user-reader
combinations:
1) Trusted (malicious/non-malicious) user & Rvalid: This
is the most common scenario, which must be handled
by IMDfence. This implies that an insider attack (from
a legitimate, malicious user) should be detected by the
non-repudiation check.
2) Any user or attacker & Rstolen: No individual will be
able to use a reader that is reported as stolen because
of the checks involved in the reader-card-authentication
phase.
3) Trusted user & Rhacked/Rforged: As a guideline, the
user needs to make sure that R is issued from a trusted
repository, which rules out the use of Rhacked and
Rforged.
4) Trusted malicious user & Rhacked: A legitimate ma-
licious user can cover his/her tracks by employing a
hacked reader that can replace the signature correspond-
TABLE III
ENUMERATION OF ATTACK SCENARIOS IN TERMS OF USER-READER
COMBINATIONS
Reader
Valid Stolen Hacked Forged
Trusted user (1) (2) (3) (3)
Trusted malicious user (1) (2) (4) (5)
Attacker (6) (2) (7) (7)
ing to a malicious command (sig or sig′), which is to
be stored in the IMD, with the one corresponding to a
safe command. Such an attack is quite costly to execute
and is timing-critical since it will involve colluding with
someone who has advanced engineering skills while
requiring that Rhacked is not reported as stolen. Since,
the user is considered trusted by the patient and can
thus be in close proximity, he/she has far easier and
inexpensive means to harm the patient without getting
caught.
5) Trusted malicious user & Rforged: Such a user cannot
send commands using a forged reader in an online case
since Rforged does not share a key with S. In the offline
case, however, such a user can use a forged reader that is
able to create a bogus sig′ and hence does not require
any involvement of C. Moreover, he/she can use the
OOB-pairing interface because of being considered as
trusted by the patient. Similar to (4), such a scenario also
requires hiring an advanced attacker to develop such a
reader, and based on the touch-to-access assumption, the
user has significantly easier methods to harm the patient.
6) Attacker & Rvalid: For online access, the communica-
tion protocol will break if A gets hold of a valid reader,
card and its associated PIN, accesses the implant from
within the hospital and during the user’s working hours,
and C is not reported as stolen. It is recommended that
the user protects his/her card and PIN, or immediately
reports it in case it is lost. Moreover, as a guideline,
the user should never lend or sell R to a third party.
The protocol will also break if A gets hold of an OOB-
paired reader and a card with valid respective tokens,
and has the knowledge of the PIN. We assume that the
paramedic resets the pairing after treatment.
7) Attacker & Rhacked/Rforged: For online access, the
attacker will not be able to use Rhacked because of
the reasons mentioned in (6) above. Similarly, he/she
cannot use Rforged since it does not have a shared key
with S. Moreover, for an offline scenario, getting hold of
these readers will not help an attacker A since the main
symmetric key (KRI ) comes from I in the OOB pairing
process. Hence, to gain advantage using these readers,
A would still need to get close to I (touch-to-access).
The attacker cannot calculate and insert a false signature
remotely since the connection between R and C is protected
by MAC-based integrity checks. In order to frame someone, A
has to force the legitimate user to use a hacked reader, which
replaces the CMD with an incorrect command. On the other
hand, in order to send the incorrect command him/herself,
A needs a valid card and its associated PIN, a reader that
can execute reader-card authentication (i.e., both R and C
are not reported as stolen), and the access has to be made
during the card-owner’s working hours and from within the
hospital network. Both of the above situations correspond
to scenarios (3) and (6). Scenario (3) should be handled
by IMDfence as mentioned above, whereas the likelihood of
stacking occurrences in (6) is very low. Also, such situations
can be prevented if the guidelines of addressing the non-
repudiation gap are followed (see Section IV-C5). All of the
above scenarios are summarized in Table III.
3) Smart-card-specific attacks: Since IMDfence employs
smart cards, it is important to ensure that it is safe from
the weaknesses [45], [46] present in another widely used
smart-card system: EMV (Europay, Mastercard, and Visa).
These vulnerabilities exist due to the availability of less secure
options for backward compatibility and due to a problematic
threat model, in which the reader (i.e., the POS terminal) is
assumed to be uncorrupted.
One major issue is that the terminal and the card do not
share a symmetric key, due to which most of the important
data is exchanged in plain-text (e.g., account data, amount
etc.). Moreover, in the offline use of the cards that do not
support public-key cryptography, the PIN is also sent as plain-
text. An attacker can modify the unencrypted initialization
messages to force the terminal to use this mode [46]. The
PIN can be recorded using e.g., a hacked terminal that has
additional probes to read data from the smart card interface.
In case of an offline-encrypted PIN, the terminal can be hacked
to record the keystrokes. Using the account data and PIN, the
attacker can create a magnetic-strip card for use in a country
that does not support chip-based smart cards [47].
Another issue is that the terminal cannot use MAC to
authenticate messages from the card since they do not
share a symmetric key. Cards following the Combined-Data-
Authentication (CDA) scheme from EMV address this by
employing signatures. However, in the schemes prior to CDA,
the terminal is unable to verify the authenticity of all the
card messages either due to unavailability of signatures (in
the case of Static Data Authentication, SDA) or the signature-
less transaction messages (in the case of Dynamic Data
Authentication, DDA). As a result, an SDA card can be cloned
for use in offline transactions [46], and a stolen DDA card can
be employed in a two-card attack, in which the attacker uses
his/her own card for PIN verification and uses the stolen card
in the transaction phase [42]. Moreover, the response of the
card at the end of PIN verification is unauthenticated. As a
result, this response can be modified to deceive the terminal
into assuming that the entered PIN is correct.
All these attacks exist because some of the critical data
is left unencrypted or not signed. In both the online and
offline modes of IMDfence, all the data between R and C
is encrypted and is authenticated using MACs. Additionally,
our recommendation to avoid magnetic-strip-based cards rules
out cloning. Similarly, avoiding contactless cards removes an
additional attack vector.
Another far more advanced type of attack is the relay
attack [45], [47], which exploits the fact that the card users
cannot know for sure if the display of the terminal is showing
correct information. It is a timing-critical attack where two
transactions are simultaneously taking place. The victim in-
serts his/her card in a counterfeit terminal (e.g., at a restaurant),
which is connected to a fake card of the attacker that is inserted
in a valid terminal (e.g. at a jewelry store). The details of the
fraudulent transaction are forwarded to the victim’s terminal.
Her screen shows the correct information, but in effect she
pays the amount for the other party.
We observe that the relay attack is far less likely in the
case of IMDfence since it requires a legitimate user operating
a forged reader. This corresponds to scenario (3), above.
4) Selecting T and NAC values: The touch-to-access prin-
ciple guarantees that unreasonably high T and NAC values do
not cause a security vulnerability in IMDfence, as evident from
Section V-A2. However, the careful reader may have noticed
that a prolonged offline operation enabled by such large values
may result in R’s and/or IMD’s firmwares getting out-of-date.
On the other hand, very small values hinder legitimate access,
i.e., availability. Therefore, the hospital server should ensure
that appropriate values are assigned to T and NAC (within
maximum and minimum limits) based on the patient’s location
and the reader-IMD usage patterns.
Regarding the patient’s locality, the probability of having
stable Internet connectivity is higher when the patient is
based in an urban area compared to a rural setting. Moreover,
it stands to reason that the chances of attackers’ presence
is ought to be higher in an urban environment. Hence, it
makes sense to assign lower T and NAC values for urban
areas compared to rural environments. When assigning these
values, reader-IMD usage patterns should also be taken into
consideration, which depend on the patient condition and
IMD type, ranging from critical implants, such as cardiac
defibrillators, to less critical ones, such as neurostimulators.
The IMDs requiring frequent reader access should be granted
larger T and NAC values. Further investigation on this topic
is interesting but is considered outside the scope of this work.
It should be noted that the modification of these parameters
can be performed throughout the operational lifetime of the
IMD. The physician is required to manually modify these
values (in S) based on the above guidelines, which then
ultimately take effect in the reader-card authentication phase
(See Fig. 3).
B. Availability - Battery-DoS protection
As highlighted in Section II, one of the system require-
ments is to ensure that the IMD is always available for
treatment. One high-likelihood and low-cost attack that affects
this requirement is the battery-DoS attack, as practically
demonstrated in [3], [4]. This attack forces the IMD to
continuously run energy-consuming operations, which results
in battery depletion and ultimately causes device shutdown.
For example, the attacker can repeatedly try to establish a con-
nection with the implant using incorrect credentials. The IMD
will scrutinize each invalid request through energy-consuming
authentication operations, which will drain its battery.
The IMD can defend against battery DoS by employing a
zero-power defense (ZPD) scheme in which the authentication
operation is executed using borrowed energy [3]. This energy
can be harvested from the incoming RF communication mes-
sages from the external reader. The IMD switches to battery
power only after it has successfully authenticated the external
entity.
Another type of DoS attack can occur when the attacker
sends repeated communication requests to the implant. For
an IMD with a single-processor, such requests may block the
device from performing its primary medical functionality. To
protect against this, a dual-CPU paradigm can be employed,
in which the first CPU executes the original medical function-
ality, while the second CPU is responsible for dealing with the
(secure) communication requests. This dual-core organization
offers, then, both functional and power decoupling, which
effectively shields the IMD main functionality from battery-
DoS attacks, as previously showcased in [12].
In order to assess the viability of IMDfence under energy-
harvesting conditions (be it in single- or dual-CPU configura-
tion), we construct the following experimental setup: (I) For
the computational costs of IMDfence, and similarly to [48],
we employ an ARM Cortex-M0+ based 32-bit MCU [49].
Due to its ultra-low-power capabilities, this MCU is be-
coming increasingly employed in IoT and WBAN settings,
and hence, is a plausible choice for this evaluation. The
security-related computations, i.e., authenticated encryption
(AES-128), cipher-based MAC and random-number genera-
tion were performed using the MCU’s dedicated peripherals
(“CRYPTO” and “TRNG”); thus, in our energy measurements
hardware-accelerated primitives are considered. (II) For the
wireless-communication costs of IMDfence, the commercial
transceiver ZL70103 specifically designed for IMDs has been
used [50]. To get reasonable energy costs for (encrypted)
data transmission, we chose packet-size lengths similar to the
ones used in low-cost RFID tags, due to their similarities
with IMDs in terms of computational, energy and memory
constraints [12]. Hence N , ID, CMD and ANS are set to
32, 96, 32 and 64 bits, respectively. The chosen sig size is 384
bits, which corresponds to an ECDSA (Elliptic Curve Digital
Signature Algorithm) signature with a 96-bit security level.
The protocol sequence executed by the IMD is shown as
numbered steps in Figures 5 and 6. The energy consumption
for these steps is shown in Fig. 10 using a supply voltage of
3.3 V, and the default MCU and transceiver clock frequencies
of 19 MHz and 24 MHz, respectively. The transceiver data rate
is set at 400 kbps (with an effective rate of 265 kbps). We
observe that the energy required for authentication (Eauth),
i.e., for steps 1 to 4 in Fig. 5, is only 59.6 µJ. Total IMD
energy consumption per type of activity is also shown Fig. 11.
For such a low harvested-energy requirement (Eauth), it has
been demonstrated before in [48] that real-time performance
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is possible in the IMD.
C. Impact on IMD Lifetime
In the previous section, we discussed the feasibility of IMD-
fence under energy-harvesting conditions to defend against
battery-DoS attacks. In this section, we wish to assess the total
energy costs that the IMDfence protocol incurs over the whole
lifetime of a modern IMD. To do so, we need to consider
realistic usage patterns of actual devices, drawn from medical
practice. As an example, we consider the communication ses-
sion between a commercial bedside reader (Merlin@homeTM)
and a pacemaker [21].
We consider different data volumes being transferred be-
tween the reader and IMD, ranging from a daily two-minute
communication session to a two-minute weekly session. Since
this reader is intended for monitoring the IMD status, it is
assumed that most of the communicated data is transferred
from the implant to the reader (e.g., in the form of data logs).
Hence, the size of ANS is increased from 64 bits (for a basic
session) to 1.9 MB in order to form a two-minute session.
However, for worst-case analysis, the transceiver is considered
to be enabled throughout this session and we do not assume the
use of energy harvesting for ZPD. Moreover, without loss of
generality and in order to more accurately (and pessimistically)
quantify the cost of adding IMDfence to an existing system,
we consider a dual-CPU IMD, as discussed in the previous
section. In this configuration, the security CPU is assumed to
execute the complete IMDfence protocol, while the medical
CPU is set to a 5% duty cycle (active vs. sleep mode), based
on typical pacemaker usage [51], and consumes 25 µJ per
heartbeat to provide electrical-stimulation impulses, based on
reported figures of commercial devices [52].
With the above consideration, the impact of IMDfence
on IMD-battery lifetime can be visualized using Fig. 12 for
different implantable-grade battery sizes [53]. The variability
in each data point captures the different volumes of data
transfer between the reader and IMD.
Since the majority of the cryptographic operations in the
protocol (authenticated encryption and MAC) are based on
symmetric block ciphers, as shown in Figures 5 and 6, it is
very interesting to investigate the impact of different cipher
versions and/or implementations thereof on IMD lifetime, e.g.,
a pacemaker. More box plots have, thus, been added to Fig. 12,
where we readily notice that the hardware implementation
of AES-128 significantly outperforms the software AES-128
implementation, plus other lightweight software ciphers such
as SPECK and MISTY1. It is also interesting to observe that
the energy impact of the hardware AES-128-based protocol is
not significant when comparing with an unsecured communi-
cation.
D. Performance
To study the impact of IMDfence on IMD performance
during normal operation, we will only analyze the bottleneck
of the reader-IMD system in this regard, i.e., the IMD itself.
This is because modern readers, such as tablets [16], have far
superior computational resources (and battery autonomy) than
implants. As far as the smart card is concerned, the amount
of computations performed by it is approximately the same
with that in commercial uses (e.g., EMV), which we know to
exhibit adequate performance.
As far as the IMD is concerned and given that the protocol
primitives are executed in hardware, the performance figure of
merit that is crucial to capture here is the delay that IMDfence
incurs to the system, both for security computations and data
transmission over the air. For unsecured data transfer, the
wireless transceiver incurs a delay of 2.2 ms. As shown in
Fig. 10, for secure data transfer the time delay incurred by
each (numbered) protocol step is no higher than 6 ms, for a
total protocol delay of 15.7 ms. For the time scales involved in
TABLE IV
SUMMARY OF COSTS FOR RUNNING THE IMDFENCE PROTOCOL ON AN
IMD
Energy Delay Prog-Mem
1 basic 1 daily IMD footprint
session (µJ) cycle∗ (J) (ms) (kB)
Without security 16.61 16.60 2.17 ∼1.00
IMDfence (H/W) 108.31 17.37 15.73 6.86
IMDfence (S/W) 213.50 18.76 57.22 7.86
∗ Which includes a daily two-minute comm. session (see Section V-B)
biological processes, we can safely assume that the IMDfence
delay overhead is negligible.
E. Summary of introduced overheads
Table IV summarizes the impact of IMDfence on an IMD
in terms of energy, performance and program-memory foot-
print. For the hardware implementation of IMDfence it can
be observed that, although the energy requirements increase
by more than 6 times for a basic session, the total daily
IMD consumption (that includes a two-minute communication
session and electrical-stimulation costs) increases from 16.60
J to just 17.37 J, which amounts to a mere 4.64% increase, as
previously shown in Fig. 12. The reason for this small increase
is that the basic medical functionality, e.g., the continuous
electrical stimulation of a pacemaker, dominates the security
provisions since the reader accesses are far less frequent. In
the case of software (AES-128) implementation of IMDfence,
the total daily IMD consumption increases by 13.01% (as
shown in Fig. 12). Moreover, there is a minimal increase
in the computational delay and required program-memory
size. In the context of current MCU technology, 6–7 kB of
additional footprint is negligible. Hence, we conclude that
there is no noticeable change in the IMD costs when IMDfence
is employed.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proposed a novel security protocol for
IMD ecosystems, IMDfence. We have demonstrated that our
approach has a comprehensive coverage of security require-
ments that are critical to these systems. This is enabled through
the use of a personal smart card and a trusted third party, which
helps in facilitating access control, non-repudiation, user au-
thentication, bedside-reader operation and system scalability.
We have also shown that IMDfence does not introduce any
noticeable overheads in the implant, and it has the ability to
support zero-power defense against battery-DoS attacks. It is
observed that our proposed protocol increases the total IMD
energy consumption by just 4.64%, which is minimal in the
context of the IMD lifespan. We have also proposed an OOB-
channel-based version of IMDfence, which enables offline or
emergency access.
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